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Recent years have seen the emergence of a policy consensus around the need for fundamental 
reforms of global drug policies. This is reflected in the call for ‘development-oriented drug 
policies’ that align and integrate drug policies with development and peacebuilding objectives, 
as captured in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These calls have been important in 
acknowledging the damage caused by the war on drugs and in drawing attention to how drugs 
are inextricably linked to wider development and peacebuilding challenges. Yet there is 
surprisingly limited academic research that looks critically at the drugs-development-peace 
nexus and which asks whether the goals of a ‘drug-free world’, ‘sustainable development’ and 
‘the promotion of peace’ are commensurate with one another, can be pursued simultaneously, 
or are indeed achievable. This articles studies these policy fields and policy-making processes 
from the geographical margins of the state – frontiers and borderland regions – because they 
offer a privileged vantage point for studying the contested nature of policymaking in relation 
to the drugs-development-peace nexus. We set out a historical political economy framework to 
critically assess the assumptions underlying the integrationist agenda, as well as the evidence 
base to support it. By developing the notion of a policy trilemma we are critical of the dominant 
policy narrative that ‘all good things come together’, showing instead the fundamental tensions 
and trade-offs between these policy fields. In exploring the interactions between these policy 
fields, we aim to advance discussion and debate on how to engage with the tensions and trade-
offs that this integrationist agenda reveals, but which have to date been largely ignored. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Recent years have seen the emergence of a policy consensus around the need for fundamental 
reforms of global drug policies. This is reflected in the call to align and integrate drug policies 
with development and peacebuilding objectives, as captured in the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) (Buxton, 2015, 2; Brombacher & Westerbarkei, 2019; Gillies et al., 2019; GIZ, 
2013; UNODC 2016).   Yet the evidence base to support this new alignment is limited and 
there has been a dearth of critical academic research that focuses on the drugs-development-
peace nexus.  To what extent are the goals of the international drug control regime, sustainable 
development and the promotion of peace commensurate with one another? What happens when 
these three policy fields converge, and become entangled with one another in drugs-affected 
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borderland regions?  What are the tensions and trade-offs involved in pursuing multiple 
objectives?   
 
Drawing upon an historical political economy framework we scrutinize the assumptions 
underlying the integrationist agenda, as well as the evidence base to support it. We are critical 
of policy narratives claiming that ‘all good things come together’, and instead present a policy 
trilemma that outlines the fundamental tensions and trade-offs, as well as the complex 
entanglements, between these policy fields. In exploring the interactions between these policy 
fields, we aim to advance debate on how to engage with these tensions and trade-offs which 
have to date been largely ignored.  
 
Central to our approach is a focus on the geographical margins of the state – frontiers and 
borderland regions. We argue that these spaces offer a privileged vantage point for studying 
the contested nature of policymaking in relation to the drug-development-peace nexus (Asad 
2004; Das et al., 2004; Goodhand, 2020; Goodhand, 2008b; Raeymaekers, 2013).   Borderlands 
are places of ambivalence and contradictions, generating both anxiety and neglect; they are 
perceived as disruptive spaces, sources of insecurity and illicit drugs, which prompt coercive 
and pacifying forms of intervention. At the same time, they frequently suffer from ‘neglect’, 
typically manifest in a lack of public services and social welfare provision.  Yet ‘unruly’ 
borderlands are also sites of innovation and transformation; both in relation to the dynamics of 
illicit economies and as laboratories of policy experimentation. Rather than being passive 
receptors of external policies, we see borderlands as places with profound and far-reaching 
effects on centres of power and law making. Therefore studying the margins may tell us 
important things about the centre; or to put it another way, the character of the whole is 
illuminated by attention to the edge. 
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The article proceeds as follows:  First, we briefly define policymaking in relation to the fields 
of drugs, development and peacebuilding. Second, we look critically at positivist models of 
policymaking. Third we map out an alternative political economy approach, informed by an 
analysis of power, space and time. Fourth we use this framework to explore the inherent 
tensions and trade-offs between, and the distributional effects of, these three policy fields. Fifth 
we tentatively map out some of the policy implications of the foregoing analysis.  
 
2. Defining policymaking and the policy fields of drugs, development and peacebuilding 
Drug policy scholars have long dwelled on what is a policy and how policy ought to be studied. 
Much of this scholarship has focused on the process of policymaking in advanced industrialised 
economies, and from a quite narrow and formalistic viewpoint in which policy is understood 
as ‘a set of interrelated decisions concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving 
them within a specific situation’ (Jenkins, cited in Bewley Taylor, 2014, 1011).  However, a 
growing body of scholarship – much of it focused on harm reduction strategies – has adopted 
a more expansive conception of policy and policy-making (Ritter 2009; Stevens & Ritter 2013; 
Fraser 2016; Lancaster et al., 2018; Fraser 2020). This literature treats policymaking and 
‘evidence making’ as political processes that are deeply entangled in and generative of the 
phenomenon – drug use, public health, crime – they purportedly seek to address.  Drawing on 
this literature we likewise adopt a broader conception of policy and policymaking.  Building 
on the work of Carol Bacchi (2012) and others (Rhodes, 2002; Buxton, 2015; Lancaster et al., 
2018), we do not assume a sharp distinction between ‘design’ and ‘implementation’ or 
‘practice’. Our conception of policymaking covers a wide range of activities, from the global 
(mission statements, strategic plans, policy fora and consultations) to the programmatic or 
project level (designs, models, strategies, implementation). This approach aligns with insights 
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from the emerging drug policy literature, which highlights the performativity of policy 
processes (Campbell & Campbell, 2000; Race, 2011; Lancaster, 2016) and the politics of 
knowledge production at national (Lancaster et al., 2017) and international levels (Singleton & 
Rubin, 2014; Ghiabi, 2018).    
  
The policy fields of drugs, development and peacebuilding are conceived here as being distinct 
but inter-dependent. Rather than being the preserve of formal actors and processes, we 
understand these policy fields as more open and amorphous involving an amalgam of informal 
actors and processes, negotiating policies that are frequently neither documented nor written 
down (Shore & Wright, 2003). Policies are mediated through the activities of public institutions 
as well as through social repertoires, everyday practices and informal or clandestine networks. 
These policies travel across different spaces and scales, spanning drug markets and drug use in 
advanced industrialised countries, through to drug production, consumption and trade in the 
borderlands of some of the poorest countries.  Policymaking rarely flows downwards and 
outwards in a smooth top down, centre-periphery fashion (Peck & Theodore, 2012).  The idea 
that Washington, Vienna, or London, or alternatively Bogota, Nay Pyi Taw, or Kabul are the 
wellsprings of policy, misses the decentred, complex and shifting nature of policy processes. 
In conflict- and drug-affected borderlands, drug policy converges with the peacebuilding and 
development fields, leading to complex entanglements and points of friction, that have wider 
ramifications for international policymaking. Much recent scholarship, however, has been 
neglectful of the dynamics of drug policy in the Global South, especially in drug producing 
countries, where drugs are a vital source of livelihoods and where issues of illicit trade, 
consumption and enforcement produce a mixture of harms and benefits. This remains a field 
of utmost importance to understand and shape global drug policy and development.   
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 The boundaries between the policy fields of drugs, development and peacebuilding are fuzzy 
and contested, and there are sub-systems within each – for example ‘harm reduction’ is a 
subfield with a distinct epistemic community, whilst at the same time cutting across the drugs 
and development policy fields. But competing mandates and funding streams, different 
organisational cultures, approaches and partnerships reinforce the boundaries between these 
policy fields. Drugs agencies, such as the UNODC, for example, tend to work through state-
to-state partnerships and top-down modalities and programmes, whilst development 
organisations tend to stress more bottom-up, participatory methodologies involving civil 
society, the private sector, and local state institutions. Distinct funding streams and the 
dominance of national-level institutions in drug policymaking often create a disjuncture 
between drug control agencies and local civil society organisations active on drug issues. 
 
On the ground, there is often a fundamental disconnect between the agencies working 
on/against drugs, and those working on development and peacebuilding. Development actors 
tend to treat drugs as a ‘taboo’ subject (Buxton, 2015). Conversely, drug policymakers frame 
drugs as primarily a criminality and security issue (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
2010), which undermine the stability of the state and impede developmental goals (United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010; Buxton, 2015; Meehan, 2015). Whilst these labels 
and mandates carry significance for the agencies themselves, they make little sense for local 
communities and public officials attempting to grapple with the deeply interconnected 
challenges of violence, illicit economies, chronic poverty and community welfare. 
 
As a result, organisational mandates and predispositions mean that drugs, development and 
peace/security are conceived as discrete problems, to be treated through separate policy 
measures. Gutierrez (2020) notes that the World Bank country diagnostics make no mention 
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of illicit drugs, while UNODC drug reports typically fail to engage with wider structural drivers 
of drug production. Yet this separation of drugs and development makes little sense if one 
considers how illicit drug production is entangled with a complex set of interlocking 
development issues and deficits including indebtedness, insecurity, lack of property rights and 
minimal citizenship rights (Duclos, 2011).   
 
However the interrelationships between these phenomena are increasingly acknowledged, and 
there is a demand for more ‘joined up’ approaches. A range of factors are driving this 
integrationist agenda, which has hitherto been driven by the work of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), such as the International Drug Policy Consortium and Christian Aid 
(Melis & Nougier, 2010; Gutierrez, 2015).  Firstly, these policy fields are shaped by structural 
processes, linked to broader shifts in global governance in the aftermath of the Cold War. There 
has been a trend towards more ambitious, expansive and approaches, because of a loosening of 
western governments’ inhibitions to intervene, and relatedly changing perceptions of risk; 
fragile states, illicit economies, maldevelopment and migration are framed as urgent security 
issues, directly threatening the interests and stability of western countries. This has contributed 
to the reframing of drugs, development and peacebuilding as investments in ‘stabilisation’, 
‘resilience’, human security and so forth (Duffield, 2007; Keen & Andersson, 2018; 
Woodward, 2017).  
 
Secondly, there are institutional interests driving this convergence. The rebadging or 
relabelling of programmes, the forging of new connections and the generation of new 
justifications for intervention are often linked to crises of legitimacy and the need to gain access 
to new revenue streams.  For instance Tate (2015) highlights how Plan Colombia was a 
godsend to the US and Colombian militaries in a post-Cold War environment where there were 
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strong pressures to downsize or find new roles for the military. The trend for drugs actors to 
reframe their work in development terms can at least in part be understood as a play for 
resources, just as development actors have recast their programmes in recent years as a vital 
investment in peacebuilding or stabilisation. The integrationist agenda is cloaked in the 
language of ‘win-win solutions’, but like other development buzzwords such as ‘participation’ 
and ‘good governance’ this language hides underlying conflicts, power struggles, battles over 
resources and the allocation of meaning. They veil the fundamental trade-offs involved in 
pursuing different policy goals. For example, the World Drug Report (2010) claims that ‘more 
development means less crime and less conflict’ and that the reduction of drug supply and drug 
trafficking ‘can help foster peace’. In a subsequent World Drug Report (2015), drugs are 
presented as part of a ‘vicious circle’ linked to bad governance and the escalation of conflict. 
As a counterpoint to this, a ‘virtuous cycle’ involving counter narcotics, development and 
peacebulding is advocated.  
 
Thirdly, there is the empirical reality of these policy fields converging and colliding in 
borderland sites. This dynamic of convergence, particularly on the margins of the state, is rarely 
a hegemonic, uncontested and smooth process. More often, it generates frictions and collisions 
and attempts by policymakers to redraw and sharpen institutional and programmatic boundaries 
linked to competing mandates and funding streams.  We return to these tensions and trade-offs 
later. 
 
3. The Temptations of the Technical: Dominant understandings of policymaking  
Notwithstanding the extensive critiques of instrumentalist, problem-solving approaches to 
policy, a positivist mindset still retains a strong foothold in the policy fields of drugs, 
development and peacebuilding. This is manifest in several ways: 
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Firstly, there is a tendency towards ahistorical thinking or what has been called liberal amnesia 
(Cramer, 2006). History, if considered, is largely seen as a backdrop and drugs-affected 
borderlands are treated as blank slates on which to enact a package of transformative policy 
measures. Secondly, teleological thinking is manifest in the developmentalist ‘conceit of 
progress’ (Edwards, 1999; Mosse, 2004), the notion of a linear transition from ‘war’ to ‘peace’ 
and the idea of statebuilding – or ‘getting to Denmark’ (Fukuyama, 2014) – as a project of 
convergence around a liberal model of the state (World Bank, 2011; Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; 
DFID, 2010).  Thirdly there is a tendency towards reification, which is particularly manifest in 
drugs fetishism in the sense that drugs are abstracted from their social, cultural and political 
contexts and are imbued with particular qualities and powers. For instance, it is taken as 
axiomatic that: poppy farmers are purely motivated by price signals; drugs are intrinsically a 
‘conflict good’ triggering violence and insurgency (e.g. Cornell, 2005; Sullivan, 2012); and 
shifts and reductions in drug production can be primarily attributed to drug policies rather than 
broader contextual factors (Drugs and (dis)order, 2020; Mansfield, 2016).  
 
Fourthly, there is the tendency for policymakers to define problems in terms of their ability to 
respond to them. Problem identification involves the drawing of sharp boundaries around 
complex social and political realities in order to generate ‘viable solutions’, i.e. responses that 
aid organisations can deliver. Solutions are constructed in primarily technical terms, filtering 
out the essential messiness and the politics that surrounds them. This temptation of the technical 
(Carothers & de Gramont, 2013) or the ‘tyranny of experts' (Easterly, 2014) serves a number 
of functions: it provides policymakers with a sense of purpose and certainty in highly 
unpredictable and contested environments; it legitimizes interventions as being ‘scientific’ and 
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evidence based (see below); it masks the underlying sets of interests, political, institutional, 
financial that frequently drive policies.  
 
Fifthly, these policy reflexes frequently align with a statist orientation amongst policymakers, 
producing what we have termed ‘borderland blindness’ (Goodhand, 2020). This blindness is 
deeply embedded and reinforced in the mental maps and organizing principles of the 
policymaking industry – the division of the world into country teams, the national planning and 
budgeting processes, the location of country offices in capital cities. These all contribute to 
capital city biases and a silencing of borderland perspectives (Goodhand, 2020).  
 
All five reflexes lead to an underplaying or filtering out of contextual factors and an 
exaggerated and distorted understanding of ‘the problem’ and the transformative powers of 
‘the solution’. These reflexes are reinforced by the ways in which evidence is collected, filtered 
and interpreted, particularly, but not exclusively, within the drug policy field.  Policies are 
selected, shaped and justified because they are seen to be ‘scientific’ and evidence-based.  They 
draw upon proven methodologies to gather data, which is used to develop models, theories of 
change and evidence about ‘what works’.  Targets and metrics of success are generated, based 
on this evidence and underlying theories of change – from number of poppy fields eradicated, 
to drug seizures, to attainment of SDG goals, to reduced levels of armed conflict.  
 
In spite of the claim to scientific validity, ‘success’ tends to be defined by external experts, and 
is shaped by dominant political interests and power structures – as manifest in the 
overwhelming focus on the eradication of drug production in the Global South rather than the 
targeting of demand reduction in northern countries. The doctrine of drug eradication remains 
the axiom guiding policy in the international field..  This state of affairs suggests that it may 
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often be a case of policy-based evidence rather than evidence-based policy; evidence is used 
selectively to support a priori positions, which are largely informed by strategic calculi, 
ideologies, beliefs and ethics.  
 
A failure to achieve benchmarks of success, and growing recognition of policy failures, lead to 
institutional crises and a call for reform in order to re-legitimise and reinvent the policy field. 
In her study of international engagement in Afghanistan Astri Surkhe (2011) argued that the 
reaction to growing evidence of failure was a  ‘critical mass’ approach; a call for greater 
investment and more expansive approaches, leading to more intrusive policy interventions in 
which the war on drugs, the war on terror, statebuilding and development were all seen as being 
mutually reinforcing, in spite of the evidence that they were generating perverse effects on 
Afghan society and undercutting one another. The call for more developmental approaches to 
drugs needs to be viewed in this light; there is a recognition that problems need to be defined 
more broadly, which has led many to call for more expansive and integrated approaches. But 
this, as we unpack further below, is based upon a problematic assumption that ‘all good things 
come together’ (Hirschman, 1967). 
 
4. An Alternative framework: Power, Space and Time 
As noted above, there is a long established critique of positivist and managerial approaches to 
policy (Autesserre, 2014; Mosse, 2004; Mosse, 2011; Bacchi, 2016; Cheng, Goodhand & 
Meehan 2018; Ferguson, 1994; Li, 2007; Khan, 2010). This body of literature provides a more 
nuanced and complex understanding of policymaking processes. It emphasizes the 
inseparability of ‘policy science’ and politics in open systems characterized by complex 
causality, contingency and uncertainty, and draws attention to the mobile, multi-level, multi-
sited nature of policymaking. 
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Drawing upon these insights, we set out below a framework for analysing and better 
understanding policymaking processes and their impacts in drugs- and conflict-affected 
borderlands. This framework – which centres on questions of power, space and time – 
challenges how policymakers currently conceptualise and respond to drugs, armed conflict and 
development. First, we argue that the framework helps re-conceptualise the borderland 
environments in which policymakers intervene and the impacts of their interventions. Second, 
the framework ‘turns the mirror inwards’ by highlighting the internal dynamics and contentious 
politics within and between the policy fields of drugs, development and peacebuilding.     
 
4.1 Power (political economy) 
At the core of our analytical framework is a political economy approach, which focuses on how 
policymaking processes and interventions are saturated with, and shaped by, questions of 
power and vested interests. Growing calls to integrate drugs, development and peacebuilding 
policies embody a comprehensive, ambitious and transformative agenda. They seek to radically 
‘rewire’ and transform drugs-affected borderlands by tackling conflict dynamics, building state 
capacities in areas of limited or contested statehood, catalysing economic development, and 
addressing illicit economies that underpin local power configurations. In Afghanistan and 
Colombia, for example, external funding has been allocated towards security related assistance 
for the military and police alongside drugs eradication and interdiction. In Myanmar and Laos, 
China has sought to transform the local economy through large-scale agribusiness development 
and major infrastructure projects in an attempt to reorient the local economy away from opium 
production (Meehan, this volume; Lu, 2017; Su, 2015).   
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Interventions in conflict- and drug-affected borderlands map onto highly complex and volatile 
spaces; where power and politics exist in a “nexus of formality and informality” (Ghiabi, 2020), 
sovereignty is highly fragmented, the means of violence are diffuse, and the state is just one of 
multiple sources of public authority. These are spaces where “the brutal politics of sovereignty” 
continue to play out, and where stability is often predicated on coalitions and bargaining 
arrangements between a wide array of actors (Goodhand, 2009, 9).  In such contexts, illicit 
drug economies are deeply embedded in local configurations of power. The potential for high 
profits – linked to the risk premium attached to drug refining and trafficking – means that drugs 
provide opportunities to accumulate capital, establish patronage networks and finance 
coercion. Threats of prosecution, promises of impunity and access to the legal economy mean 
that drugs become central to coalition management and bargaining processes (Meehan, 2015). 
The global war on drugs, and in some contexts pressures from local communities to tackle drug 
supply and consumption (see Dan, Maran & Sadan, this volume), becomes enmeshed in these 
bargaining processes which involve plays for resources and legitimacy.  
 
Interveners typically portray themselves as external to the contexts they engage with, as neutral 
referees rather than active players (Cheng, Goodhand & Meehan, 2018, 82; de Waal, 2009). 
Instead, greater attention must focus on how interventions shape, and become entangled with 
material interests (coercive power, financial resources, patronage structures) and non-material 
resources (legitimacy, norms, beliefs, values) as they enter into volatile and contested political 
spaces (Rhodes & Lancaster, 2019). Policies related to drugs, development and peacebuilding, 
rather than being seen as an external antidote to internal problems, need to be reframed as 
inherent to the political economy of drugs- and conflict-affected borderlands. As Christine Bell 
(2015, 16) argues, a political economy analysis “does not just point to the need for development 
actors to understand local political actors better, it points to the fact that development actors 
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will need to understand their own decisions as political and try to reconcile them with their 
normative commitments.”  
 
A political economy approach also emphasizes the need to focus on the ‘distributive’ impacts 
rather than just ‘aggregate’ impact of policy. Drug policies have typically gauged success 
through aggregate measures, such as reduction in land under cultivation, amount of crops 
eradicated or volumes of drugs interceded. For example, the peace process in Colombia been 
dominated by a ‘zero-coca’ approach, in some cases tying coca eradication to state assistance 
programs (Felbab-Brown, 2020).  While in the eyes of policymakers these measures may 
represent net social benefits, their costs are distributed highly unevenly between different social 
groups and across different spaces and scales – something that is overlooked in narratives that 
promise ‘win-win’ solutions.   
 
There has been growing acknowledgement amongst policymakers of the need to take questions 
of politics and power seriously and to integrate them into planning (DFID, 2010; Gravingholt 
,2011; Ingram, 2014/2015). However, this political economy lens is typically focused on the 
contexts where interventions take place, and does not ‘turn the mirror inwards’ to integrate 
questions of politics and power into the study of policymaking processes themselves (Cheng, 
Goodhand & Meehan, 2018). There is a need for greater focus on the vested interests, points 
of friction, institutional pressures, conflicts, tensions, and trade-offs that exist within and 
between policy fields and interventions.   Interveners are themselves part of a political economy 
and set of market forces – geopolitically, institutionally and financially. Such organisations 
have ‘soft’ interests (declared goals and principles) and underlying ‘hard interests’ (market 
share, profile, professional status) (De Waal, 1997).  The official rules of the game and the 
rules in use may be quite different, reflecting significant gaps between stated goals and 
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underlying interests. For example, Keen and Andersson (2018) argue that the security 
paradigms surroundings drugs, terrorism and migration can be better understood less by how 
effective they are in achieving stated goals, than by the distribution of costs of benefits that are 
accrued by the assemblage of actors involved. Although policies surrounding drugs, migration 
and terrorism may ‘fail’ on a global level according to their stated aims (for example, reducing 
levels of drug supply), they succeed in achieving a set of unstated goals: they reframe complex 
issues in narrow political terms, which concentrates attention on supply counties in the Global 
South, and determine who has the power to set policy agendas; they reward various actors 
involved in these policies; and they involve a process of risk transfer in which the most 
marginal actors, including drug producers and users in low-income countries, bear the brunt of 
the violence and stigmatisation associated with these policies. A political economy approach 
goes beyond a focus on whether interventions work – something that creates a narrow and 
technical fixation on measuring success against stated goals – in order to better understand how 
they work and who for. As David Mosse (2004) argues, the fixation on success or failure of 
interventions against stated goals obscures the complex work that policy performs in enrolling 
different audiences and stakeholders, with different sets of interests. Policy ‘success’ is as much 
about performance and representation – the ability to mobilise diverse groups – as it is about 
the achievement of stated goals. A political economy analysis of policymaking processes 
reveals the complex and contradictory sets of interests within and between intervening actors 
and how the subsequent bargaining processes and power-plays surrounding interventions can 
shape policy outcomes. The integrationist agenda promises a greater synergy between the 
policy fields of drugs, development and peacebuilding, which have hitherto been largely siloed. 
However, calls for greater alignment tend to skirt over the underlying economic and 
geopolitical interests, and hidden loyalties, tensions, ideologies and hubris that continue to 
shape these policies. 




In addition to being more conscious of the politics of policy, there is a need for a more explicit 
recognition of its spatial dimensions. Greater sensitivity to issues of space and scale brings into 
focus, first, the need to challenge ‘borderland blindness’ so as to better understand the 
complexities and sensitivities of borderland spaces and the challenges they pose to 
policymakers, and second, the need to analyse the fluidity and multi-scalar nature of 
policymaking itself.  
 
“The centrality of territory in state self-definition” has meant that control over international 
borders remains a priority for states, albeit a deeply problematic one in many parts of the world 
where “states are ‘younger’ than the societies they purport to administer and the demarcation 
of borders preceded nation-building” (Goodhand, 2008, 228; van Schendel 2013, 267). Trade, 
migration, capital flows and familial networks have historically extended beyond the national 
borders constructed by states (Sadan, 2013). This has created identities, loyalties, institutions 
and resource flows beyond the purview of the state and which challenge state elites’ efforts to 
construct “exclusive national cultures” (Paasi, 2003, 111). As a result borderlands are often 
“sensitive spaces” for states (Cons, 2016; Goodhand, this volume; Koehler & Moosekhel, this 
volume). They are frequently places with an insurrectionary tradition, where monopolies over 
the means of coercion are disputed, law and order is perceived to be limited, and loyalties are 
questionable.   
 
Policymakers have often embraced a “diffusionist” narrative and associated set of measures as 
an antidote to the ‘pathologies’ of the margins (Harvey, 2005, 55). This has involved 
integrating ‘lagging regions’ into national political structures and national and regional 
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economies through the expansion of state and market institutions. This approach – infused with 
a powerful “civilising frontier rhetoric” (Cramer & Richards, 2011, 289) – presents states and 
markets as pacifying and stabilizing forces that can transform unruly borderlands into areas of 
licit and productive activities.    
 
However, this narrative masks the complexity, tensions, and systems of public authority and 
service provision, which precede and shape interventions in these spaces. As Nancy Lee Peluso 
and Christian Lund (2011, 668) argue, the margins “are not sites where ‘development’ and 
‘progress’ meet ‘wilderness’ or traditional lands and peoples. They are sites where authorities, 
sovereignties and hegemonies of the recent past have been or are currently being challenged 
by new enclosures, territorializations, and property regimes.” Furthermore, diffusionist 
narratives ignore the dynamism and agency within borderland regions. These are not passive 
spaces awaiting integration. They are places of innovation and experimentation in their own 
right, the impacts of which can radiate outwards to impact on systems of power and 
development processes within countries and wider regions. For example, in Myanmar, the 
country's borderlands became key testing grounds for government efforts to liberalise the 
economy in the late 1980s and 1990s as the central government sought to capitalise on 
longstanding illicit cross-border economies. Furthermore, at the same time as the government 
launched a sustained crackdown on pro-democracy protests throughout the country, it explored 
new approaches for dealing with opposition in the margins through reaching ceasefire 
agreement with various borderland-based armed groups. Growing stability, expanding 
borderland resource extraction and cross-border trade (including illicit trade) generated new 
revenue flows that underpinned the national economy and the country’s emerging private 
sector (including banks, airlines and private construction companies), infrastructure 
development and the real estate market (Meehan, 2011).    
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These insights reveal a number of important challenges to the integrationist agenda. They show 
the need to address the ‘borderland blindness’ and state-centric biases inherent to 
policymaking. They also show the need for policymakers to engage more deeply with the 
causes of those borderland ‘pathologies’ – violence, illegality and underdevelopment – that 
they purportedly seek to address. In many contexts, these pathologies are less a consequence 
of the lack of political and economic integration in borderland regions, than a function of the 
way these integrative processes are imposed, resisted, subverted and brokered by multiple sets 
of actors, interests and relations operating across local, national, cross-border and global scales. 
Longstanding illegal drug economies are rarely simply the product of anarchic or ungoverned 
spaces. Instead, they commonly become embedded in the conflicts, negotiations and 
compromises surrounding how authority and markets are constituted in contested spaces.  
 
Thinking spatially also provides an entry-point for analysing how policies ‘travel’, and moving 
beyond simplistic notions of policy diffusion from ‘centres’ to ‘peripheries’. It draws attention 
to the dynamics of policy fluidity, circulation, transfer and diffusion. It shows how policy is 
malleable as it travels through networks and intersects with multiple, and often competing, sets 
of interests and how it encounters ‘friction’ as it moves (Tsing, 2004).  By “following the 
policy” (Peck & Theodore, 2012) – or the ontological journeys of policy (Ghiabi, this volume) 
– it becomes possible to explore how policies are negotiated and re-worked. Policymaking 
chains tie together diverse actors, with different or competing interests. Within the global 
context of the war on drugs, states may demonstrate public commitment to prohibition and 
eradication, while on the ground in borderlands counter-insurgency, state consolidation and 
revenue generation may be more pressing priorities that result in a more pragmatic engagement 
with drugs (McCoy, 2017) .  
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Furthermore, thinking spatially reveals internal tensions and contradictions that often exist 
within policy fields and interventions. Intervening actors are not monolithic and tensions often 
manifest themselves at different scales. For example the interests and priorities of ‘China’s’ 
interventions in Myanmar’s borderlands look very different when viewed at different scales. 
At a national-level, concerns about the influx of drugs and the spread of HIV/AIDS as a result 
of injecting drug use resulted in the Chinese State Council establishing an Opium Replacement 
Special Fund, designed to support business-led poppy substitution programmes in northern 
Myanmar. At a provincial level, Yunnan political and business elites have viewed expanding 
cross-border trade and revenue flows – including those linked to illicit goods – as a key engine 
for economic development. Yunnan companies have primarily viewed state-level opium 
substitution initiatives as a way to fuel cross-border investment regardless of its impact on 
reducing opium production (Meehan, this volume). 
 
Keane’s (2016) research on US counter-narcotics policies in Afghanistan also reveal the ways 
in which policies are re-worked as they travel and become embedded in drug-affected 
borderlands. Aside from the disconnect between Washington and the field – ‘the 10,000 mile 
screw driver’ – within Afghanistan, agency cultures and predispositions led to turf battles and 
disconnects between various arms of the US intervention. The Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (eradication), the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(interdiction), USAID (alternative development), and Department of Defence (counter-
insurgency) all understood and framed the drugs issue in different and frequently contradictory 
ways, even though there was rhetorical agreement that “it was no longer just a drug problem – 
it was an economic problem, a political problem, a security problem” (Thomas Schweich, cited 
in Keane, 2016, 301). 




4.3 Time (history) 
The final pillar of our analytical framework emphasizes the importance of an historical and 
temporal sensibility. History is often treated merely as context or backdrop. The orientation of 
interventions is always forward-looking and “future positive” (Edwards, 1999). Such historical 
amnesia may be partly functional. There are strong incentives to put the mistakes of the past 
behind, and to constantly be starting with a blank slate. But an historical lens reveals how drugs 
and armed conflict are deeply embedded in the social relations and power structures of many 
borderland regions. As Martin Smith writes, in Myanmar (1999), insurgency became a “way 
of life”; not in the narrow sense of vested material interests perpetuating armed conflict, but 
rather, how longstanding armed conflict has generated its own sets of networks, loyalties and 
coping mechanisms, of which drugs are a key part. This points to the complex and historically 
accumulated entanglements between drugs and all aspects of social and economic life in the 
borderlands – and warns against assumptions that better integrated policies surrounding drugs, 
development and peacebuilding will provide a policy fix to drug issues.  
 
History also challenges policymaking hubris and an exaggerated belief in the transformative 
potential of external policies (Hirschman, 1967). An historical sensibility encourages a sense 
of realism and perspective about the broader structural factors that shape and constrain policy 
and how costs and benefits of interventions are distributed unevenly across generations. Our 
historical political economy framework focuses less on interventions in vacuo – their professed 
aims and implementation – but instead concentrates on how policies interact with the pre-
existing terrain of social structures, material interests, power relations and belief systems. This 
approach reveals that interventions in contested borderland spaces are often defined by 
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processes of ‘bricolage’ and ‘sedimentation’ in which interventions ‘pile up’ alongside pre-
existing structures of authority and response mechanisms (Bierschenk et al. 2002, 6; 
Rasmussen & Lund, 2018, 395; Douglas, 1986; Ghiabi, 2019 and this volume). An historical 
lens also offers a starting point for exploring why social groups may react to policy 
interventions in different ways (see Sadan, Dan & Maran, this volume).  
 
Historical analysis also provides a lens to better understand the foundations, worldviews and 
genealogies of policymaking discourses, processes and regimes (Bacchi, 2009; Seddon, 2016). 
It can illuminate where ideas come from, how they are recycled, reinvented and repackaged, 
and the sets of interests that underpin policy fields and regimes. For example, the notion that 
development interventions can provide an antidote to the “disordered faults of progress” 
(Cowen & Shenton, 1996) – a way to provide order and stability during processes of rapid and 
disruptive political and economic change – is an old idea whose roots can be traced back to 
early industrialization, but which finds itself reinvented in contemporary World Bank thinking 
about civil wars as development in reverse and development as an investment in security 
(Cramer, 2016; Duffield, 2007). A more granular historical analysis of policy regimes and 
institutions also provides an entry-point to understand the vested interests that drive 
continuities and changes within policy. Deep-seated and slow to change power structures often 
play a much more influential role in shaping policy decisions than evidence of policy success 
or failure. For example, Martin Jelsma (2015) argues that the reinvigoration of the war on drugs 
in the 1990s was motivated by broader historical shifts surrounding the end of the Cold War, 
which meant that counter-narcotics policies became an important means through which to 
legitimise and protect military budgets. The Pentagon became the lead agency for drug 
interdiction, the 1990s were declared the “Decade Against Drug Abuse”, and US funding 
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underpinned the creation in 1991 of the UN International Drug Control Programme (Jelsma, 
2003; Jelsma, 2015).  
 
 
5. The drugs-development-peacebuilding policy trilemma 
As explored above, the integrationist position tends to skirt over the difficult tensions and trade-
offs that ensue in drugs-affected borderlands where the policy fields of drugs, development and 
peacebuilding converge. Dani Rodrik’s (2011) notion of a policy trilemma provides a heuristic 
device for further exploring these tensions and trade-offs.  Rodrik, in the context of 
international development, has challenged the liberal assumption that “all good things come 
together” (Hirschman, 1967) by arguing that it is not possible for countries to simultaneously 
pursue economic integration, national sovereignty and democratisation. Instead, he contends 
that countries can work towards two of these conditions, but not three at any one time.  At least 
one of these three conditions has to be sacrificed. National policymakers, public opinion and 
social actors will ignore the trilemma at their own peril. This would necessarily involve 
downgrading or compromising on goals and understanding and making explicit – possibly at 
critical points – the trade-offs involved in pursuing some goals and not others. 
 
The trilemma does not imply that the three conditions are totally incommensurate with one 
another, but they cannot all be pursued at the same time without some compromises. For 
example, pulling back on economic integration, or relaxing criteria for national sovereignty 
can give countries greater room for manoeuvre, with the potential to move into a constructive 
policy path. The trilemma has a temporal dimension in the sense that it may be possible to 
pursue all three goals if they are not done simultaneously but in a sequenced and gradual 
fashion over a long time period. 
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We argue here that there is a similar kind of policy trilemma – and thus analytical framework 
– in relation to drugs, development and peacebuilding.  It may be very difficult, if not 
impossible to pursue all three goals at the same time i.e. (1) A drug free world (2) Inclusive 
economic growth (3) Sustainable peace.  For example, the assumption that the reduction of 
drug production is always compatible with peace, because it undercuts the access to rents by 
non-state armed actors can be fatally flawed in both directions: peace can come with increased 
drug production, and war dynamics can be tamed by pacts that allow different parties to receive 
its cut from relevant rents (Meehan, 2011; Snyder, 2006).   Pursued simultaneously in their 
‘hardest’ and most dogmatic forms, the trilemma becomes much sharper. Relaxing or changing 
the criteria of ‘success’ and changing the timeframes and sequencing are likely to make the 
trilemma easier to handle.  
 
It is important to note that there is an asymmetry in the drugs-development-peace trilemma, 
firstly in the sense that whilst inclusive development and sustainable peace are widely 
supported as positive aspirational goals, the idea of a ‘drug free world’ does not command 
universal support. Secondly, the ‘disruptive potential’ of coercive drugs policies is 
proportionately greater, and can undermine achievement of the other two goals of development 
and peace. 
 
It is also recognised that within – as well as between – each of these policy fields there are 
divisions, tensions and trade-offs; for example between ‘harder’ and ‘softer’ approaches to 
drugs; between rapid growth and broad based development; between the return of order and 
more inclusive forms of ‘positive peace’. At the same time the trilemma is experienced 
unevenly by different sets of actors, within and across countries – international policymakers, 
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national government officials and local civil society actors will all have different sets of 
assumptions about the priorities and trade-offs in relation to each of these fields. 
 
If the policy goals, and what is regarded as ‘best practice’ in each of these policy fields are 
relaxed, then the trilemma becomes more manageable. But this involves explicit recognition of 
the need to sacrifice or relax certain criteria.  Also if the short-term, long-term trade-off is 
acknowledged then perhaps the trilemma is less acute – the problem is compounded when 
policymakers pretend that all good things – in their ‘ideal’ form – can all come at once.  This 
picture of positive convergence is very hard to sustain in borderland regions because of the 
particular features of these zones, as outlined above – including the centrality of illicit drug 
economies to local livelihoods and power structures, and the limited authority and presence of 
the state to provide public goods services or to enforce drug policies and peace agreements.  
 
If the policy goal is a sustainable war to peace transition, in drug-affected borderlands, as well 
as at the national level, then a more explicit and deliberative weighing up of the trade- offs and 
distributive impacts of policies related to drugs, development and peacebuilding, is required. 
The key dimensions of the trilemma can be set out in the following diagram. 
 
Figure 1: The Policy Trilemma [see separate attachment] 
 
The trilemma is less about making mutually exclusive choices, than calibrating different sets 
of policies so that they are more attuned to local contexts, needs and priorities. The trade-offs 
between and within these policy fields are explored in turn below: 
 
Drugs 
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The deleterious impacts of the war on drugs, both in terms of its stated goals and its 
humanitarian and development consequences have been extensively documented and are not 
rehearsed here in any detail. 
 
Firstly, there is a sharp trade-off between coercive counter-narcotics (CN) policies and 
development processes and outcomes. The eradication of illicit crops can undermine peasant 
livelihoods and social safety nets without offering any other alternative, frequently 
undermining as well legal economies (Drugs and (dis)order, 2020). Alternative development 
(AD), which in many countries goes hand in hand with counter-narcotics and counter-
insurgency, has failed to produce tangible developmental effects, even in its own terms. This 
calls into question the idea that AD is somehow a sub-field, like harm reduction, which is 
closely aligned to development goals and approaches and can thus be a vehicle for integrating 
drugs and development – and as such might help ‘soften’ or dissolve the trade-off. 
 
Secondly, militarized and/or otherwise coercive CN has been shown to have a range of negative 
impacts on political order and sustainable peace.  Paramilitarized approaches may pluralise or 
fragment the means of coercion, undermine or disrupt national or local political settlements, 
decrease incentives for armed groups to engage in peace talks, inadvertently boost recruitment 
into rebel groups and so forth. Therefore the trade-offs between harder CN policies and 
development and peacebuilding goals, have been widely recognized and documented. 
 
Development 
Within the policy mantra that ‘all good things come together’ there is the assumption that 
tackling drugs and promoting development are mutually reinforcing. Although the SDGs make 
only minor reference to illicit drugs issues, it is assumed that development will generate viable 
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alternative livelihood options for those engaged in drug economies. However, our research 
indicates a more complex relationship between drugs and development, which implies that 
efforts to integrate development and drug policy agendas face difficult trade-offs.     
 
Development may generate new forms of dispossession, exclusion and livelihood insecurity 
that push people into engaging with illicit drug economies. In Myanmar, the better-off are more 
able to profit from economic liberalisation and agricultural commercialisation than poorer 
households, who face worsening debt and dispossession and for whom opium cultivation 
becomes a means to stave off destitution (Meehan, this volume). In Colombia, coca cultivation 
is the alternative livelihood for rural populations who have been marginalised as a result of a 
development pathway defined by high levels of land concentration, worsening feasibility of 
family farming, and increasing inequality between the rural and urban worlds (Gutiérrez Sanín, 
this volume). In both cases, the involvement of rural populations in illicit economies is not 
simply a function of longstanding marginality and a lack of development, but is a result of new 
forms of impoverishment and precarity created by development processes (see also Gootenberg 
& Davalos, 2018; Le Cour Grandmaison et al., 2019; Morris, 2020). Even where the aggregate 
impact of development has been broadly positive – economic growth, greater agricultural 
productivity, and so forth – the benefits and costs of development are distributed highly 
unevenly, and often in ways that can expose certain populations – particularly those in 
borderland regions – to social dislocation and trauma that manifest in forms of widespread 
alcohol and drug abuse (Sadan, Dan & Maran, this volume; Alexander, 2008).   
 
Further complicating the assumed synergy between tackling drugs and promoting 
development, drug economies can also have positive development effects, especially on the 
poorest and most marginalised. At the household level, illicit drug cultivation across 
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Afghanistan, Colombia and Myanmar has provided a key ‘safety net’ for some of the poorest 
populations, and has also offered a means of social advancement. As Gutiérrez Sanín argues 
(this volume), the coca economy offers five key characteristics that have enabled coca to have 
a more positive impact on the development of rural populations than licit agriculture: coca is 
relatively egalitarian in terms of land tenure; it is relatively profitable even for very small 
landholders; it is labour intensive; it is resilient in that it can support livelihoods without state 
provision of public good or subsidies; and it is not conducive to monoculture, thus enabling 
households to cultivate coca alongside maintaining food security. Across all three countries, 
farmers report that illicit drug cultivation enables them to access credit and pay for basic 
services such as healthcare. In Afghanistan, opium cultivation has also stimulated agricultural 
expansion, making previously uncultivated desert land commercially viable by generating the 
income to invest in irrigation (Mansfield, 2016). In some cases, drug cultivation has even 
enabled social advancement by enabling households to invest in their children’s education and 
to invest in new income-generating opportunities. Illicit drug economies also have wider 
developmental effects. They generate capital that is invested in local, national and regional 
economies, and they animate the expansion of trading networks into marginalised areas, thus 
contributing to greater regional licit and illicit commerce. Indeed, in borderland areas long 
neglected by central governments, revenue from illicit drug economies has also enabled 
communities to invest in public goods – including basic infrastructures and services – that the 
state has failed to provide, demonstrating how illicit economies can at times generate ‘state 
effects’.   
 
These tensions and trade-offs vary across different drug-affected regions. In Colombia, the 
opportunities that coca cultivation creates for social advancement are offset against the risks 
posed by eradication and by the violence that surrounds the drug economy (Drugs and 
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(dis)order, 2020). In Myanmar, the benefits to local livelihoods generated by illicit opium 
cultivation have been increasingly offset by worsening levels of harmful drug use amongst 




Efforts to reduce large-scale armed violence also involve difficult trade-offs with both drugs 
and development policy. Negotiations surrounding the allocation of rents linked to the drug 
economy may be integral to stabilising political settlements that manage armed conflict in drug-
affected borderlands (Goodhand, 2008; Meehan, 2011). Illicit drug economies may be an 
essential foundation of local power structures. These are also regions of highly fragmented 
sovereignty where it extremely difficult for any actor (state or non-state) to monopolise or 
prohibit drug production (Snyder, 2006). Informal agreements between warring parties are thus 
often rooted in re-working relationships surrounding illicit drug flows, rather than seeking to 
dismantle them (Meehan, 2015). Subsequent efforts to tackle drugs may destabilise political 
settlements that have coalesced around the drug economy. For example in Afghanistan, US 
pressure on the Karzai administration to implement opium bans destabilised local power 
structures, antagonised rural elites who were forced to implement bans. This delegitimized 
government authority in the eyes of rural populations, and opened a space for the Taliban to 
pose as the protectors of the peasantry from destructive and externally driven drug bans 
(Goodhand, 2008; Mansfield, 2016). In northern Myanmar, social movements that have 
mobilised in an attempt to address worsening drug harms (Dan, Maran & Sadan; Sadan, Dan 
& Maran; Maran & Sadan, all this volume), have challenged the tacit agreements between the 
Myanmar army and local militias, and relationships between local authorities and rural 
populations involved in drug cultivation.    
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Efforts to stabilise armed conflict can also result in forms of “elite capture”, where elites 
monopolise the benefits of peace and leave little scope for sustained progressive change 
(Cheng, Goodhand & Meehan, 2018, 3). Such outcomes are not simply a consequence of 
flawed peace negotiations that may be improved through better design and implementation in 
the future (Bhatia, this volume). Rather, the potential to monopolise the benefits of peace may 
be what enables transitions out of large-scale armed violence in the first place, and that allows 
these transitions to endure (Cheng, Goodhand & Meehan, 2018). The tensions surrounding 
these trade-offs can shift over time. In some cases, efforts by elites to broaden their 
constituencies or pressures to strengthen their legitimacy may facilitate more inclusive 
outcomes. In other cases, elite capture has exposed populations to ongoing forms of violence, 
eroded public support for peace deals, and generated new conflict dynamics, as has been the 
case in parts of Myanmar since 2010. 
 
Therefore, the above discussion of trade-offs shows both that ‘all good thing do not come 
together’, but also that all ‘evil’ does not necessarily lead to harm, in the sense that drug 
economies may have productive and positive effects on processes of development and 
peacebuilding.  Whilst counter-narcotics policies have clearly undermined the achievement of 
SDG goals, drug economies in certain contexts may play a role in advancing them.  This raises 
difficult challenges for policymakers that cannot be skirted over by integrationist talk. 
 
6. Conclusion: Managing Trade-offs and the implications of the drugs-development-peace 
trilemma 
Rodrik’s trilemma was developed as a critique of a development policy paradigm, which 
assumed that the ‘right’ policies could be implemented irrespective of context and pursued 
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simultaneously. Instead he argued that trade-offs cannot be avoided and that the choices made 
by national policymakers need to be informed by, and tailored to, the different histories, 
development paths, and constraints faced by individual countries.   
 
We have argued above that there is a similar, though asymmetrical, policy trilemma in relation 
to drugs, development and peace. This leads to a conclusion, like Rodrik’s, that there is a need 
to rethink the current integrationist agenda surrounding drugs, which does not sufficiently take 
into account local contexts, fundamental trade-offs and the deleterious effects of pursuing 
incommensurate goals simultaneously. This integrationist agenda represents primarily a policy 
trilemma involving three relatively discrete policy fields, focusing on choices and trade-offs 
between them.  But our subsequent analysis of trade-offs, has revealed a more complex picture 
than this initial framework implies. Both the idea of a smooth integration of drugs, development 
and peacebuilding interventions, or alternatively the notion of sharply defined and distinct 
policy fields are inaccurate and unhelpful -- conceptually and empirically.  In borderland sites, 
these fields converge, ‘pile up’ and become entangled with one another. Interventions are 
absorbed and reshaped in the borderlands, mutating as they travel, and sharp trade-offs become 
fuzzier as they encounter the hybrid institutions and diffuse power structures characteristic of 
these marginal zones. Therefore it is important to both acknowledge the complexity of these 
policy fields as they enter ‘living’ borderlands, whilst not losing sight of the value of the policy 
trilemma as a heuristic device to study the tensions, trade-offs, distributive effects and choices 
involved.  
 
Firstly, within each of these policy fields there are significant tensions and trade-offs – for 
example between eradication and harm reduction, between growth and equity, between 
stability and inclusive peace. In each policy field there are numerous sub-fields and areas of 
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contestation, so that that the meanings and goals associated with drugs, development and peace 
are always fluid and unstable, and shift as they travel and ‘hit the ground’. 
 
Secondly, it is unhelpful to detach ideal-type policy fields, from the phenomena themselves – 
drug economies, processes of development and conflict and peacebuilding dynamics are key 
structural features and determinates of borderland contexts. And the shifting balance between 
these three sets of forces shape trajectories into and out of armed conflict and the sustainability 
of post-war transitions.  The salience of each of these three phenomena in any one context, 
changes over time, and these shifts may only be tenuously related to policies in these three 
areas. For example increased investments in counter-narcotics efforts may occur alongside 
significant increases in drug production, as has been the case in Afghanistan.  Major 
investments in peacemaking may take place in parallel with escalations in armed conflict.  Our 
political economy framework shows that there is a need to keep the role of policy in 
perspective, without denying its importance at certain times in particular contexts. Therefore 
the trilemma framework needs to incorporate a ‘double vision’ – maintaining an awareness of 
both the policy field and the empirical phenomenon – and their relationship to one another.  In 
this sense it should encourage a focus on both trade-offs and connections – but our 
understanding of these connections is more complex, contextualised and multi-dimensional 
than that of the integrationist position.  
 
Thirdly, the policy trilemma is not about the technical issues related to ‘best practice’, 
sequencing and efficiency. We have emphasized in this paper the need to ‘turn the mirror 
inwards’ so as to engage with the political economy of policymaking. The tensions and trade-
offs surrounding the policy trilemma generates political choices. Understanding the 
policymaking processes and outcomes requires being conscious of who makes these choices, 
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why, with what effects, and who bears the costs of these decisions. Who decides on the trade-
offs and who benefits and loses out as a result of these decisions? Rodrik (2011) argues that 
successful development paths have occurred when national actors have the policy space to take 
control and responsibility in making policies that are more attuned with local realities.  The 
war on drugs tends to reduce the room for manoeuvre of national policymakers, leading to 
policies that are responsive to external rather than internal constituencies. This doesn’t mean 
that national elites always make the right decisions, though generally they have to bear the 
costs of their decisions, more so than is the case with external actors. This approach also 
generates greater scope to engage in more meaningful ways with how borderland communities 
themselves confront – and seek to respond to – the tensions and trade-offs outlined in the policy 
trilemma. Of course, localised responses should not be seen as a panacea and can generate their 
own problematic outcomes. Yet, interventions are likely to fail or generate further adverse 
impacts where there is significant misalignment between externally-driven responses (whether 
by international or national actors) and local responses and priorities (Dan, Maran & Sadan, 
this volume).   
 
Fourthly, the trilemma has a strong spatial dimension – the trade-offs have ramifications 
beyond the national frame of reference. For instance pressures by international actors to reduce 
drug supply can be destabilizing and create immediate costs for domestic actors, whilst having 
less direct costs for international actors, at least in the short term.  Policies that appear to 
generate aggregate benefits at the national level may produce ‘negative externalities’ for 
borderland populations. Ostensibly successful efforts at drug reduction may simply push the 
problem over borders – so the policy trilemma may become more manageable on one side of 
the border and more acute and stark on the other side. As Keen and Andersson (2018) note, the 
war on drugs involves a process of risk transfer onto groups and regions with the least voice, 
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so again the response to the trilemma may involve displacing the problem rather than resolving 
it.   
 
We have sought to emphasize the importance of a borderland lens for better understanding the 
spatial dimensions of policy processes and for strengthening engagement with those 
participating in illicit drug economies (producers, transporters or consumers) across the Global 
South. The perspective of those living in drugs-affected environments are poorly represented 
– or not represented at all – in global and national policy debates on drugs, development and 
peacebuilding. This approach does not automatically mean deprioritising drugs. As the 
Myanmar case shows, there may be domestic constituencies for counter-narcotics. Whilst in 
Colombia coca farmers may not see their futures as being tied up with illicit drugs, which they 
would happily trade for more predictable and less violent ways of making a living, so long as 
security and development were on offer. Instead, it reveals that borderland regions are not 
passive receptors of policies that diffuse outwards from the centre, but are also often sites of 
innovation and experimentation in addressing the tensions surrounding drugs, development and 
peace that borderland populations experience in their daily lives.   
 
Fifth, the trilemma has a strong temporal dimension.  As the case of the Cocaleros movement 
in Colombia suggests, if coca farmers had access to licit markets, and public goods including 
services and security, they would no longer cultivate coca, but the key point is that their version 
of ‘development’ and ‘peace’ would need to precede drug eradication. The trilemma is perhaps 
starkest and least manageable during moments of change, when pushing hard on drug issues 
may push countries into new rounds of conflict and undermine fragile safety nets.  This does 
not necessarily mean ‘forgetting about drugs’ but the trilemma can be softened by focusing on 
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harm reduction and violence reduction, rather than forced eradication during these periods of 
transition.  
 
This paper has set out an analytical framework founded upon questions of power, space and 
time as a way to address the policy trilemma created by efforts to integrate drugs, development 
and peacebuilding. In doing so, this article aims to advance discussion and debate on how to 
engage with the tensions and trade-offs that this integrationist agenda reveals, but which have 
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